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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on June 5, 2013; at which time Ms. Cruz was 
convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance. Ms. Cruz filed her Notice of Appeal on July 
5, 2013; an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 23, 2013. The District Court heard argument and 
took the matter under advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order affirming the conviction on December 31, 2013, and Ms. Cruz now timely appeals. On 
appeal, Ms. Cruz asserts that the trial court committed error when it failed to instruct the jury on 
the defense of necessity. 
Statement of the Facts 
Ashely Cruz is a 22 year-old marketing manager for World Wide Concept. (6/5/13 Tr. 
P .118, Ls.5-8). Ashley was the passenger in a vehicle driven by Harlow Patoray on February 8, 
2013. The vehicle was stopped for making a wide turn and not using a proper signal. ( 6/5/13 Tr. 
P.46, Ls.1-23). As the officer activated his emergency lights the driver pulled to the side of the 
road and stopped briefly, then it continued and stopped again, then it continued further and then 
pulled into a parking lot and stopped again. (6/5/13 Tr. P.45, Ls.4-12). The car stopped and 
went several times and Trooper Hurley testified that in his experience the driver is attempting to 
delay the officer's approach to the vehicle, and they are attemoting to hide things they don't want 
the officer to know about. (6/5/13 Tr. P.47, Ls.19-25). Upon approaching the car Trooper 
Hurley immediately asked Ashely to step out of the vehicle and even after she admitted there 
was marijuana in the vehicle he continued to question her about anything on her person. (6/5/13 
Tr. P.51, Ls.16-25). 
Trooper Hurley identified Harlow Patoray as the individual driving the vehicle and 
verified that a warrant was outstanding for his arrest. (6/5/13 Tr. P.77, Ls.16-21). Trooper 
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Hurley testified that Mr. Patoray was comfortable with the police presence and that he observed 
him explaining the entire process to Ashley. . (6/5/13 Tr. P.77, Ls.1-16). Trooper Hurley 
believed that he was comfortable with the criminal justice system and that he knew the process 
and had prior dealings with the Court to get a warrant for his arrest. (6/5/13 Tr. P.78, Ls.1-18) 
Trooper Hurley believed that Ashley's statements were consistent with someone not telling the 
truth. (6/5/13 Tr. P.80, Ls.1-7). Trooper Hurley observed movement between Mr. Patoray and 
Ashley and believed it was about a minute, or an extended period of time before he made actual 
contact with the occupants of the vehicle. (6/5/13 Tr. P.80, Ls.17-25). There was a period of 
time before Mr. Patoray was removed from the vehicle in which Trooper Hurley had to remind 
him to keep his hands on the steering wheel. (6/5/13 Tr. P.90, Ls.13-17). There was also a 
period of time in which Mr. Patoray and Ashley were in the back of the police cruiser and Mr. 
Patoray's words are inaudible. (6/5/13 Tr. P.85, Ls.11-21). Trooper Hurley eventually found a 
half bag of marijuana in the center console of the vehicle. (6/5/13 Tr. P.90, Ls.6-9). 
Trooper Hurley testified that because Mr. Patoray was going to be taken to jail, if he had 
marijuana on his person he would have been charged with a felony for introducing contraband. 
(6/5/13 Tr. P.95, Ls.1-4). It is of note that Mr. Patoray was six foot and weighed 175 pounds. 
(6/5/13 Tr. P.87, Ls.13-20) and Ashley was five foot one and weighed 110 pounds. (6/5/13 Tr. 
P.88, Ls.5-8). 
Ashley testified that when the lights first came on Mr. Patoray hadn't noticed and when 
Ashley pointed it out to him he started to freak out. (6/5/13 Tr. P.121, Ls.7-18). He pulled 
marijuana out of his pocket, told her he had a warrant and that he did not have a license. ( 6/5/13 
Tr. P .121, Ls. 7-18). As they were pulling over Mr. Patoray took his hand down and put it to his 
left pocket and pulled out some marijuana and under-tossed it toward Ashley. (6/5/13 Tr. P.122; 
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Ls.7-9). An argument began because Ashley had no record or criminal history and did not want 
to take the blame for Mr. Patoray. (6/5/13 Tr. P.122, Ls.12-21). Mr. Patoray responded that he 
has a baby on the way and that it would be a second offense for him and it would be a felony. 
(6/5/13 Tr. P.122, Ls.12-21). Mr. Patoray began to get angry and told Ashley that his brother 
just got out of prison and he would not be happy with her if he went to jail. (6/5/13 Tr. P.123, 
Ls.1-5). Due to Ashley's previous encounters with Domestic Violence she decided to disengage 
from the situation and not escalate it any further. (6/5/13 Tr. P.123, Ls.6-25). Mr. Patoray kept 
telling her not to say anything or she would go to jail too. (6/5/13 Tr. P.123, Ls.10-15). Ashley 
testified that it was the tone of voice Mr. Patoray used that was threatening. (6/5/13 Tr. P.153, 
Ls.11-25). It was the way he kept raising his voice and the manner in which he was waving his 
arms and making hand motions and gestures that she felt very threatened and felt it was in her 
best interest to comply with what Mr. Patoray wanted. (6/5/13 Tr. P.153, Ls.11-25). 
Ashley didn't believe she couldn't show Mr. Patoray that she was upset, she didn't want 
to cry, and she didn't want to continue to argue with him because of his threatening behavior so 
she laughed with him as a nervous reaction to the entire situation. (6/5/13 Tr. P.145, Ls.17-23). 
Ashley testified that she did not feel safe because of Mr. Patoray' s proximity to the situation and 
that's why she could not make any other admissions to the officer. (6/5/13 Tr. P.134, Ls.3-14). 
Ashley believed it would be easier to take the blame then and there come and explain in further 
detail why her actions were the way they were. (6/5/13 Tr. P.153, Ls.11-25). 
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ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err when it failed to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Defense Of Necessity. 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Cruz asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of 
necessity thereby depriving her of her constitutional right to due process, in violation of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution and therefore the conviction must be vacated. 
B. Standard of Review 
The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which Idaho appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414, 34 P.3d 1096, 1097 (Ct.App.2001). 
When reviewing jury instructions, the court must first ask whether the instructions as a whole, 
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. Id. To be reversible error, 
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Young, 138 
Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002). 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Defense OfNecessitv. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person shall be 
... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. The Fifth Amendment's right to due process of law includes the requirement that the State 
bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees 
that, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
ID. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States Supreme 
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Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution to Art. 
1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dep 't of Health and Welfare ex rel. 
Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227, 970 P.2d 14, 20 (1998). Thus, the due process requirement that 
the State bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt is also a requirement of Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The right to present a defense is a fundamental right of due process of law which includes 
the defendant's right to present its version of the facts. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220, 23 9 
P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[a]s a rule, the trial court is 
required to give pertinent instructions by which the jury may be correctly informed with respect 
to the nature and elements of the crime charged and any essential legal principles available to the 
evidence admitted." State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 20, 981 P.2d 738, 745 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
"The basic premise behind the necessity defense is that a person who is compelled to 
commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not be punished for that act." 
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564 (1990). Courts have allowed the 
necessity defense to be raised in a variety of circumstances. In Hastings, for example, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to raise the defense of necessity to a charge 
of felony possession of marijuana where the defendant claimed that she suffered from 
rheumatoid arthritis and used the marijuana to control the pain and muscle spasms associated 
with the disease. Id at 855-56, 801 P.2d at 564-65. 
In State v. Shotton, 458 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1983), which was cited by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Hastings, see 118 Idaho at 564, 801 P.2d at 855, a defendant was allowed to raise the 
defense of necessity to a charge of driving under the influence where the defendant claimed that 
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she had been assaulted and battered by her husband and was driving herself to the hospital when 
she was arrested. Shotton, 458 A2d at 1106. 
In State v. Messler, 562 A.2d 1138 (Conn. Ct. App. 1989), also cited by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Hastings, 118 Idaho at 564, 801 P.2d at 855, a defendant was allowed to raise 
the defense of necessity to a charge of speeding where the defendant claimed that he sped up to 
pass other cars and get back in the right hand land so that a police officer in pursuit of another 
vehicle could get around him. Id. at 1139, 1142. 
In Bozeman v. State, 714 So.2d 570 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998), a defendant was allowed to 
raise the defense of necessity to a charge of driving while his license was suspended. Id. at 571. 
The defendant claimed that although he knew his ex-wife had been drinking when he got into a 
car with her, he did not believe that she was intoxicated. Id. However, after his wife drove 
"unsafely" by "running through stop signs, stuff like this," the defendant determined that she was 
a danger to others on the road and took over driving the car, intending to take his ex-wife to her 
home. Id. The court found these facts to be sufficient to entitle the defendant to an instruction 
on the defense of necessity. Id. at 572. Further, the defendant's testimony indicated "that he 
believed he had no viable alternatives to driving." Id. The defendant's concessions that he could 
have perhaps called somebody to come and get him rather than drive his ex-wife's vehicle, and 
that he could have taken her keys away (but feared he could get in trouble for doing so), "merely 
created an evidentiary dispute on the question of viable alternative measures which should have 
been resolved by the jury rather than the trial court." Id. 
A defense of necessity is not intended to disprove any element of the crime or to disprove 
that the crime occurred; rather, the premise of the "the necessity defense is that a person who is 
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compelled to commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not be punished for 
that act." Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855,801 P.2d at 564. 
The District Court incorrectly held that no reasonable view of the evidence supported Ms. 
Cruz's theory of defense because there was no specific threat of immediate harm and that Ms. 
Cruz could have chosen another, less offensive alternative. However, the questions of whether 
there was a specific threat of immediate harm under the specific circumstances of this case, and 
whether Ms. Cruz believed she could have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive 
alternative means are questions of fact for the jury. As the Shotton court explained, a necessity 
defense instruction should be given where the "evidence presented at trial [is] sufficient to raise a 
question of fact for the jury as to whether defendant drove because it was reasonably conceived 
by [him] to have been a necessity." Shotton, 458 A.2d at 1106. "Further, '[w]here there is 
evidence offered which supports the elements of the defense, the questions of reasonableness and 
credibility are for the jury to decide."' Id. ( citation omitted). 
There is ample case law to suggest that the trial court should have instructed the jury as to 
the necessity defense. State v. Spurr, 114 Idaho 277,279, 755 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Ct.App.1988) 
which address proposed jury instructions, states that the matters necessary for the jury's 
information referenced in 19-2132(a) include presenting the jury with the law as applied to the 
defendant's theory of justification or excuse. The defendant is entitled to instructions on his 
theory of defense if he presents some evidence, at least, in support of his position. Ultimately, a 
court's failure to instruct a jury fully constitutes reversible error. Ms. Cruz presented evidence 
with regard to all of the elements in this case and it then became a factual determination for the 
jury to make. 
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In Hastings, the Supreme Court held that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether or 
not the defendant has met the elements of a defense of necessity. Id at 856. It's a relatively low 
threshold to instruct the jury on a specific issue and the basic premise behind the necessity 
defense is that a person is compelled to commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm 
and they should not be punished for that. Id at 855. The elements of the common law defense of 
necessity are: 
1. A specific threat of immediate harm 
2. The circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have been brought 
about by the defendant; 
3. The same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive 
alternative available to the actor. 
4. The harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. 
Id. The following, is a four part analysis which is used to determine whether a jury 
instruction was properly denied: 1) identify the specific elements necessary for the requested 
instruction; 2) define the statutory/common law elements; 3) consider the evidence presented to 
determine whether such evidence supports the requested instruction; and 4) if the requested 
instruction is not supported by the evidence, the court must reject the requested instruction. State 
v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996). Finally, the defendant in a criminal 
action is entitled to have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury through an instruction 
if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support the theory. Tadlock 136 Idaho at 
414. 
The Court, in its denial of the request for the necessity instruction stated as follows: 
"Well, as I look at the necessity instructions, and the defendant has to 
meet all of them, it's not enough that she meet one-... 
--Two or three of the elements. She has to meet all of them. I find that 
No. 2 and No. 4 have been met. I don't find that No. 1 has been met because it 
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requires a specific threat and although the defendant testified to I'm not sure 
that she really articulated it well, exactly how it was that she was threatened, but I 
di know that was what was absent in the articulation is a specific threat made by 
Harlow to the defendant, you better say this is yours or else. That was not 
present. 
I don't find that 3 was met - has been met either because, as the 
prosecutor rightly points out, she is with an officer and the fact of the matter is 
that her first contact Vvith the officer was in front of the officer's vehicle while the 
driver was still in the other vehicle. And that was an opportunity for her, if she 
chose to, to indicate to the officer that she felt threatened. She was away from the 
diver at that point. There's no reason that she should have felt like she couldn't 
disclose that information to the officer at that time. And so I don't find that she 
meets -- ... 
--3 either. 
(6/5/113 Tr., p.164, L.22 - p. 166 L.1 ). Because the Court found that element No. 2 and element 
No. 4 had been met those will not be addressed and this analysis will focus on element No. 1 and 
element No. 3. 
The trial court erred when it determined the defendant had not met element No. 1; a 
specific threat of immediate harm. In Howley, the Court held that there was no specific threat of 
immediate harm to justify the abduction of a 39 year old woman Collins-Macchio based on her 
mother's fear that she was going to take her own children and move to a dangerous bomb shelter 
in Montana that was owned by Collins-Macchio's church. Howley, 128 Idaho at 875. The 
testimony which was given regarding Collins-Macchio plans to move to Montana was that 
"maybe someday we'll move" to Bozeman. Id. Thus, the evidence in that case did not support 
the contention that Collins-Macchio had the intention of moving to a place that would pose a 
specific threat of immediate harm to her or her children. Id. At 879. The Court held that the 
"possibility of harm at an indeterminate date in the future, is insufficient to satisfy the first 
element of the necessity defense." Id. 
In this case there is much more than a "possibility" of harm. The evidence which was 
introduced at trial was that Harlow Patoray was six foot and over 175 pounds. Ashley was five 
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foot one and weighed 110 pounds. Trooper Hurley recognized that Mr. Patoray was very 
familiar with the [criminal justice] system, because he was explaining the process to Ashley and 
outlining what the trooper was doing. Mr. Patoray had a warrant for his arrest and was going to 
jail that night regardless of the outcome of any search. However, if Mr. Patoray was found to be 
in possession of marijuana when he was taken to the jail he would have been charged with a 
felony for introducing contraband. There was also a time during the investigation where Mr. 
Patoray had to be reminded to keep his hands on the steering wheel. 
Trooper Hurley believed that Ashely's actions were consistent with somebody who was 
not telling the truth. Trooper Hurley testified that there was movement between Mr. Patoray and 
Ashley, kind of back and forth, during the initial stop of the vehicle. Mr. Patoray and Ashley 
were in the vehicle for about a minute before contact is actually made with the occupants of the 
vehicle. At some point both individuals are placed in the back of the patrol car together and 
there is a period of time which there are inaudible statements. Trooper Hurley admitted that 
during traffic stops it is common for people to be nervous, anxious, and scared. 
Ashley testified that when they got pulled over Mr. Patoray took his hand down and put it 
to his left pocket and pulled out some marijuana and under-tossed it. An argument began 
because Ashley had no record and did not want to take the blame for him. Mr. Patoray 
responded that he has a baby on the way and that it would be a second offense for him and it 
would be a felony. He started getting angry and told her that his brother just got out of prison 
and he would not be happy with her if he went to jail. Due to Ashley's previous encounters with 
Domestic Violence she decided to disengage from the situation and not escalate it any further. 
He kept telling her not to say anything or she would go to jail too. Ashley testified that it was the 
tone of voice Mr. Patoray used that was threatening. It was the way he kept raising his voice and 
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the manner in which he was waving his arms and making hand motions and gestures that she felt 
very threatened and felt it was in her best interest to comply with what Mr. Patoray wanted. 
This case is distinguishable from the facts in Howley. In Howley there was no threat of 
immediate harm because the testimony elicited was that maybe the family would move to 
Montana sometime in the future 60-90 miles from the church's bomb shelter. Even without a 
statement such as "you do this or else I will kill you" in this case there was a threat of immediate 
harm. The standard here is whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would 
support the theory. An overt statement does not need to be made for an individual to feel 
threatened. Mr. Patoray was double the size of Ashley and made argued with her, threatened her 
and the inference from that threat is physical violence. This was not some possible threat in the 
future, it was happening right at the moment and it was reasonable for Ashley to have felt 
threatened, to have been scared, nervous and anxious and to just try and get out of the situation 
as quickly as possible. 
Trooper Hurley's testimony regarding the size difference, the amount of time they were 
alone in the vehicles together, Mr. Patoray's warrant and evidence that he could have faced a 
felony had he been found to have marijuana on his person; combined with Ashley's testimony 
that she felt threatened and that she had no other choice but to comply with Mr. Patoray's request 
is reasonable to believe that Mr. Patoray could have threatened Ashley and it should have been 
for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she met the elements of the defense. 
The trial court erred when it determined the defendant had not met element No. 3, which 
is the same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative to the 
actor. The trial court in its denial articulated a time it believed Ashley could have told the officer 
about the threats and it was at first contact. 
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However the testimony which was introduced was at first contact Trooper Hurley 
immediately began badgering her about something he believed she had put down her pants. 
Ashley told the officer that she had nothing on her but he would not let it go and kept asking 
about it. Ashley testified that she felt harassed by the officer and that she was scared, nervous, 
and anxious and just had marijuana thrown at her as well as was told the individual she though 
was a friend did not have a license and had a warrant out for his arrest. 
Ashley testified that all the stopping and going was arguing over what to do with the 
Marijuana and she felt threatened by Mr. Patoray and wanted to just get out of the situation with 
the least amount of problems possible. There were no other officers present during the 
investigation and because she had been placed in the police car with Mr. Patoray she didn't feel 
she could really say anything. She couldn't show Mr. Patoray that she was upset, she didn't 
want to cry, and she didn't want to continue to argue with him because of his threatening 
behavior so she laughed with him as a nervous reaction to the entire situation. Ashley testified 
that she did not feel safe and that's why she could not make any other admissions to the officer. 
Ashley believed it would be easier to take the blame then and there come and explain in further 
detail why my actions were the way they were. 
Based on all the testimony which was presented at the trial level there was a reasonable 
view of the evidence which would support the theory presented by the defense. It should have 
been for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she met all the elements of the defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Cruz respectfully requests that this court vacate her 
judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative grant a new trial 
and direct the trial court to properly instruct the jury. 
DATED this 15th day of May 2014. 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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